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SAFETY STUDY -

PRIME NUCLEAR AIRLIFT FORCE (PNAF) MISSIONS INVOLVING THE USE OF C-130 AND C-141 AIRCRAFT.

Major John G. Dean

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DIRECTORATE OF NUCLEAR SURETY

Air Force Inspection and Safety Center Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico 87117

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INTRODUCTION

This is a study of the safety aspects of transporting nuclear weapons by military cargo aircraft. The safety history of nuclear cargo airlifts and other related operations was used to predict the expected frequency of accidents.

Several kinds of accidents could have been chosen as a basis for the study.

The basis chosen was that of a "Broken Arrow" accident.

A Broken Arrow is defined as an accident or unexpected event involving a nuclear weapon that results in any of the following consequences: nuclear detonation; nonnuclear detonation or burning; loss, theft, seizure, or destruction; radioactive contamination; actual or perceived public hazard. Some elements of this definition describe events that are much more likely to happen than others. The most likely is "perceived public hazard." This is judged to correspond to any accident in which an aircraft carrying a nuclear weapon is destroyed or irreparably damaged.

Occurrences of "actual public hazard" are much less likely to occur. Studies by Sandia National Laboratories 1,2 attempt to statistically describe accident environments and the response of classes of nuclear weapons that could be involved in those accidents. This approach gives probability numbers for the occurrence of accidents defined in terms of what actually happens to the weapons. Other studies incorporate damage models that attempt the next step of finding the probability of occurrence of accidents defined in terms of what ultimately happens to people and property.

There is considerable uncertainty in each of these steps, especially when the accident is defined in terms of consequences to people and property. These uncertainties arise because the data consist of small or ambiguous samples. The justification for "one more study" must ultimately rest on the reduction of some of this uncertainty and therefore on data. This study is based on a large body of accident reports that were carefully screened to obtain a

consistent set applicable to nuclear airlift operations. The data is presented in tabular form in the report, and individual summaries of the accidents are in a separate appendix.

OBJECTIVES

Determine the expected frequency of occurrence of accidents to cargo aircraft transporting nuclear weapons that would result in destruction of or irreparable damage to the aircraft.

Identify factors contributing to the accident rate that can be changed by improvements to the system.

DISCUSSION

The study objectives require determination of an accident rate for C-130 and C-141 aircraft. The rate needed is destroyed aircraft per amount of flying exposure. We will primarily use a "departure" as a unit of flying exposure, where a departure is one takeoff (followed ultimately by landing and including all between). The preference for departures, instead of miles or hours of flight, is because the accident data show a very low incidence of accidents in cruise flight. Also, to keep the magnitude of the numbers near one, the rate will usually be expressed as destroyed aircraft per million departures.

If nuclear weapons were carried as routine cargo on a representative sample of all kinds of C-141 and C-130 missions, a very direct analytical approach would suffice. Assuming a similarity between the operational conditions of the recent past and of the near future, one could use the observed accident rate to predict the future accident rate by statistical means.

PNAF operations are not strictly typical of all C-141 operations or of all C-130 operations. But, despite the differences that exist, the direct approach could still be used if the historical rate used was PNAF destroyed aircraft per million PNAF departures. This historical rate for both the C-130 and C-141 is zero; however, we will show that this fact permits little precision

in the analysis since it would almost always be observed. That is, we will later show that the C-141 has an accident rate of about three and one-half destroyed aircraft per million departures and the PNAF C-141 rate is of the order of one per million departures. The whole history of C-141 PNAF flying is of the order of 10,000 departures. Therefore, assuming the Poisson distribution applies, out of a large number of samples each of 10,000 C-141 departures one would expect to find zero destroyed aircraft accidents in any given sample about 96% of the time. Even though we have accurate data on PNAF accidents (zero of them) and on PNAF departures for both C-141 and C-130 operations, we cannot precisely predict accident rates by direct methods because the historical sample is too small.

An indirect method of predicting the PNAF accident rates is to use the larger sample of historical data, representing all C-141 operations and all C-130 operations. This data could be used directly if there were no differences between PNAF flights and typical flights. However, differences are known to exist and their influence must be allowed for.

A significant area of difference is that the overall history will include many different types of operations, and some of these may be of a class having a very different accident rate from PNAF operations. An example would be combat airlift operations. This atypical class must be excluded from the data base by deleting the accidents and the departures attributable to the excluded operations. The remaining data would be a large historical sample of all operations having approximately the same intrinsic hazards as PNAF operations.

Another source of differences is that factors influencing accident rates may be present in actual PNAF operations to a different degree than they are present in the larger "all operations similar to PNAF" sample. These factors are grouped in this study as factors involving crew selection and training, factors involving maintenance, and factors involving conditions of flight.

To make the best possible prediction of accident rate from the "all operations similar to PNAF" sample, the effect of each of these differences must be estimated, and a correction for the effect included. It is worth noting that any exclusions made in going from "all operations" to "all operations similar to PNAF" are aimed at excluding operations having hazards not found in PNAF operations; while corrections made for effects of crew selection, maintenance, and conditions of flight are to account for hazards that are present in PNAF operations but are possibly present to a different degree.

The step in the analysis of excluding from the data base those types of operations having, as a class, a very different accident rate would best be done by examining historical accident rates for all of the various types of operations. Unfortunately, the data base will not permit this. The accident reports are very complete, and one can easily assign an accident occurrence to a given type of operation and then accumulate totals. However, there is no detailed breakdown available on flying exposure by type of operation. Thus, the rates cannot be obtained. The only alternative is to make judgments that certain operations involve hazards not found in PNAF operations and then to exclude accidents occurring during those operations. Having done this, one must then also exclude all of the flying exposure related to those operations. However, we have already said that the data to make that exclusion is not available. The unhappy result is that a poorly supportable estimate is required. In the C-141 data, no accidents that destroyed aircraft are excluded, and we assume all C-141 operations to be "similar to PNAF." In the C-130 data, exclusions are needed for actual combat operations, combat airlift proficiency training, initial crew training including maneuvering related to combat aircraft, low-level search and rescue, and weather reconnaissance typhoon penetrations. The excluded accidents and flying exposure are discussed in the "Data Base" section.

Estimates of the effects of crew selection, maintenance, and conditions of flight to allow adjustments to the accident rate predicted from "all operations similar to PNAF" are obtained by examining a body of accident data concerning commercial aircraft. The comparison involves commercial aircraft generally similar to the C-141. Four important assumptions are made. The first is that the correction, used as a multiplier, that is estimated for obtaining the C-141 PNAF rate from the C-141 "all operations" rate is also applicable to the C-130. Only the C-141 and similar commercial aircraft are actually compared. The comparison is not repeated for the C-130 and large commercial turboprop aircraft. The next two assumptions are that PNAF crew selection results in crew proficiency equal to that found in the commercial flying used for comparison and that, likewise, the PNAF maintenance practices result in equipment reliability equal to that in the comparison commercial flying. The last assumption is that PNAF conditions of flight are less frequently as hazardous as those found in the comparison commercial flying.

Since the comparison commercial flying has a historical accident rate that is over three times better than the corresponding C-141 accident rate, all of these last assumptions tend to project a safer picture of PNAF operations.

The effect of the crew selection assumption and the aircraft maintenance assumption is to say that the PNAF accident rate is better than the "all operations similar to PNAF" rate and, for the C-141, is equal to the comparison commercial flying accident rate. If the reader disagrees with the assumptions, they at least allow rapid mental adjustments to the conclusions. For example, the commercial rate is roughly three times better (lower) than the C-141 "all operations" rate. If one believes that PNAF crew selection and maintenance practices are ineffective, use the C-141 "all operations" rate. If one believes that PNAF crew selection and maintenance practices are very much better than commercial practice, one could estimate a commensurate

further improvement. The assumption made in this study, that of equality, is based primarily on the author's personal perceptions. A check of the reasonability of this assumption was made by providing a draft copy of this study to the Headquarters, Military Airlift Command office in charge of nuclear airlift operations and to some Air Force Reserve C-141 pilots who are also commercial airline pilots. They concurred that the assumption was reasonable. The special PNAF procedures for crew selection and maintenance are established by Military Airlift Command Regulation 55-18, Volume I (C1). The part applicable to crew selection is Chapter 2, paragraphs 2-7 and 2-8. Maintenance is covered in Chapter 8, especially paragraph 8-2, "Aircraft Selection and Preparation."

The assumption that PNAF flying is less frequently as hazardous as the comparison commercial flying has to do with the character of the accident histories for the C-141 and the comparison commercial flying. By the method used to select and tabulate accident data in this report, 40% of the accidents that destroyed commercial aircraft involved weather as a cause or contributing factor. Only 11% of the destroyed C-141 aircraft similarly involved weather. Because of the small number (nine) of destroyed C-141 aircraft, one of which was caused by weather, this apparent difference is not conclusive. However, it is supported by the perception that commercial aircrews are under pressure to adhere to schedules and routinely fly into weather conditions that C-141 aircrews avoid. A National Transportation Safety Board special study 11 reports that 47% of air carrier accidents occur during instrument landing system (ILS) precision approach, indicating a significantly increased hazard during adverse weather landings. PNAF missions especially avoid those conditions since the extra restrictions in their mission planning result in a substantial weather margin built in. The restrictions that are most effective in this respect are over-flight restrictions and selection of alternate/emergency airfields with nuclear airlift support capability. By the time all of the restrictions have

been met, the flight plan is so constrained that, if the destination area weather is marginal, you usually just don't go. Avoiding adverse terminal area weather may further improve the PNAF accident rate by roughly 30%.

DATA BASE

Tabular summaries of all the data used in this study are presented in this section. Most of the source data is organized in a separate appendix because the accident reports are privileged and distribution is limited by AFR 127-4, "Investigating and Reporting U.S. Air Force Mishaps."

While data on several different classifications of aircraft accidents are summarized, the accident class used as a basis of comparison and for conclusions in this study is an accident in which an aircraft is destroyed or irreparably damaged. There have been no such accidents on PNAF flights of either C-141 or C-130 aircraft.

Data on all C-141 flights over the whole history of the aircraft through 1979 are used, in part, to estimate the accident rate for C-141 PNAF flights. Data on all C-130 flights through 1978 are used, in part, to estimate the accident rate for C-130 PNAF flights. Data on certain U.S. air carrier operations are also used. All data on the C-141 and C-130 aircraft were obtained from the Air Force Inspection and Safety Center at Norton AFB, California. 6,7,8,9 The civil aviation data were obtained from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Washington D.C. 4,10

Table 1 summarizes total flying for the C-141 aircraft. None of this total is excluded since no significant amount of C-141 flying differs sufficiently from PNAF flying.

Table 2 summarizes total flying for the C-130 aircraft. Excluded flying is shown and deducted from the totals. Exclusions were made for flights conducted under conditions which differ significantly from PNAF flights.

The large number of excluded accidents in the C-130 history of 60 destroyed

aircraft requires a substantial correction to the amount of flying. However, how much flying to exclude is not known and has to be estimated. This is because the flying history data for a type of aircraft is reported in a separate system from accident reports and is used primarily for different purposes. Thus, we cannot determine how much flying is associated, for instance, with low-level flight operations or with combat-zone operations where actual combat was taking place. So, we do not have a good basis for setting the correction.

An estimate is made by noting that the years 1966 through 1973 had the most departures per year, exceeding other years by about 70,000 departures each year. These years span the peak Vietnam war period, so the total correction for combat-related operations is estimated at 500,000 departures. The other excluded activities are estimated to account for 200,000 departures over the 18-year history of C-130 operations.

Figure 1 shows the categories used by the NTSB in tabulating data on U.S. air carriers. All of the tables of commercial aircraft accident data use these categories. The NTSB data are from References 4, 10, 11, and 12. Tables directly extracted from these references are so labeled. References 10 and 12 are directly included or condensed in the separate appendix.

The data on U.S. air carriers, used to compare to C-141 data, include all operations of certificated route carriers, supplemental carriers, and commercial operators of large aircraft that involved aircraft types similar to the C-141. The aircraft types included are shown in Table 3, along with their accident rates and total flying hours for the years 1968 through 1977. Table 3 only applies to certificated route carriers, but their operations account for 94% of the total flying hours by U.S. air carriers during 1977. The selected aircraft types shown account for 84.25% of the flying hours for certificated route carriers during the time period 1968 through 1977.

The accident rates in Table 4 come from detailed tabulation of commercial aircraft accidents shown in Table 7. The "All Accidents" category is defined more restrictively than the NTSB definition which counts accidents in which passenger injuries occur but the aircraft is undamaged.

Tables 5, 6, and 7 are summaries of the accidents considered in this study. Table 5 shows C-141 accidents; Table 6 shows C-130 accidents; and Table 7 shows the commercial aircraft accidents used in this study for comparison purposes. These tables summarize the circumstances of the accidents in four broad areas: accident class; cause of the accident; phase of flight in which the accident occurred; and categorization of the type of accident. The commercial accidents in Table 7 have a reduced list of causes and factors and are not categorized by accident type. A full list of definitions is provided in the "Keys to Accident Tables."

TABLE 1. C-141 TOTAL FLYING EXPOSURE BY YEAR

YEAR	HOURS FLOWN	NUMBER SORTIES	NUMBER DEPARTURES
65	35,367		37,450
66	189,240	39,794	122,007.
67	461,772	96,082	194,333
68	672,627	163,439	244,166
69	642,291	208,654	253,917
70	612,518	147,265	251,790
71	487,929	125,318	235,288
72	471,440	121,151	213,995
73	362,532	97,014	181,814
74	286,377	78,500	177,351
75	314,771	85,134	169,149
76	281,622	77,981	155,365
77	299,191	83,461	171,598
78	282,594	81,205	170,983
TOTAL	5,400,277	1,404,998	2,577,256
		(2.0	08 Hr/Departure)

TABLE 2. C-130 TOTAL FLYING EXPOSURE BY YEAR

YEAR	HOURS FLOWN	NUMBER SORTIES	NUMBER DEPARTURES
65	554,237		313,325
66	730,887	242,761	469,245
67	659,861	283,436	448,183
68	594,058	334,372	445,338
69	537,126	350,559	436,509
70	504,113	241.335	422,852
71	487,137	185,962	430,005
72	480,989	155,418	413,695
73	399,605	131,720	374,987
74	360,549	117,736	371,934
75	365,181	151,764	383,740
76	336,592	124,444	323,726
77	334,524	126,973	335,040
78	348,168	144,420	364,841
TOTAL	6,693,047	2,590,900	5,533,420

Excluded (Combat-Related) - 500,000 Departures

Excluded (Other)

- 200,000 Departures

PNAF Total

- 4,800,000 Departures

(1.21 Hr/Departure)




Figure 1. Classification and Type of Service, U.S. Air Carriers

TABLE 3. ACCIDENTS, RATES BY AIRCRAFT MAKE AND MODEL U.S. CERTIFICATED ROUTE AIR CARRIERS, ALL OPERATIONS 1968 - 1978 (1978 PRELIMINARY)*

AIRCRAFT MAKE & MODEL	ACCI TOTAL	DENTS FATAL	AIRCRAFT HOURS FLOWN	ACCIDENT R 100,000 AIRCRAF TOTAL	
B-747	28	2	2,851,904	0.98	0.07
B-707 <u>1</u> /	67	14 2/	10,906,499	0.61	0.10
8~720	10	1	1,947,518	0.51	0.05
8-727	93	10	20,299,441	0.46	0.05
8-737	12	1	2,952,316	0.41	0.03
DC-8	56	5	6,296,514	0.89	0.08
DC-9	43	11 2/	9,409,311	0.46	0.10
DC-10	12	2	1,975,911	0.61	0.10
L-1011	12	2	1,052,458	1,14	0.19
CV-880	5	1	687,067	0.73	0.15
BAC-1-11	8	_0	1,040,980	0./7	0.00
TOTAL	346	49	59,419,919	0.58	0.08

^{1/} A sabotage accident which occurred 8 September 1974 is included in all computations except rates.

Note: These makes and models of aircraft are the most widely used by certificated route air carriers, but this list does not contain the entire accident experience for this category of operations during the indicated years. The types shown flew a total of 53,585,612 hours from 1968 through 1977, while all types and models flew 63,597,427 hours in the same time period.

* Reference 4

TABLE 4. ACCIDENT RATES AND EXPOSURE FOR SELECTED AIRCRAFT TYPES, ALL OPERATIONS, ALL U.S. AIR CARRIERS

YEAR	HOURS FLOWN (THOUSANDS)	DEPARTURES HOUR	DEPARTURES (100,000)	AC ALL*	CIDENTS DESTROYED		ER 100,000 ARTURES DESTROYED
1967	4945	1.0	49.5	12	5	. 242	.101
1968	5395	. 96	51.8	20	5	. 386	.097
1969	5678	. 91	51.7	27	4	.\$22	.077
1970	5451	.88	48.0	20	7	.417	.146
1971	5381	.88.	47.4	19	4	.401	.084
1972	5309	. 88	46.7	24	5	.514	.107
1973	5480	. 87	47.7	19	5	. 398	.105
1974	5036	. 86	43.3	16	6	.370	.139
1975	5090	.87	44.3	16	2	. 361	.045
1976	5247	<u>.87</u>	45.6	13	<u>_3</u>	.285	.066
TOTAL	53,013		475.9	186	46	.391	.097

^{*} Accidents having damage classified as "substantial" or more by the NTSB.

This differs from the NTSB "All Accidents" rates which include injury-only type accidents that result in no damage to the aircraft.

Note: Accident occurrences taken from NTSB accident briefs which are condensed in the appendix,

 $[\]underline{\mathbf{2}}/$ Includes midair collision accidents nonfatal to air carrier occupants, excluded in fatal accident rates.

KEYS TO ACCIDENT TABLES

USAF Reports

Injury Classes

- F Fatal
- Mj Major (required hospitalization)
- Mn Minor
- N None

Damage Classes

- D Destroyed/Irreparably Damaged
- Mi Major
- Mn Minor
- N None

NTSB Reports

Injury Classes

- F Fatal
- S Serious
- N None/Minor
- X/Y For collisions with other aircraft, "X" is injuries aboard accident aircraft and "Y" is injuries aboard other aircraft.

Damage Classes

- D Destroyed
- S Substantial
- M Minor
- N None

All Reports

<u>Causes/Factors</u>. This includes the following categories of causes and contributing factors as discernible from the accident report:

Weather

Aircrew

Judgment: Aircrew used poor judgment and endangered the aircraft.

Wrong Action: Aircrew procedures were improper (misapplied controls, etc.).

Communication: Aircrew communication procedures were improper (failed to make a communication, used wrong communication procedure, missed hearing a communication, or misunderstood a communication).

Crew Rest: Aircrew violated crew rest rules.

Training: Aircrew was inadequately trained in an area significant to the accident.

Maintenance

Personnel Error: Poor maintenance.

Procedures/Data: Maintenance personnel followed standing rules, but the procedures or technical data were wrong or faulty.

Equipment, Test Gear: Faulty maintenance equipment contributed to the accident.

Airport, Airways, Facilities

Controller Error: Controller (including all ground personnel who issue instructions, clearances, and other information to the aircrew) made an error.

Communication: Same as for aircrew communication but applies to controllers.

Radar, Radio, etc: Ground electronic equipment failure contributed to the accident.

Ground Operations: Nonmaintenance ground activities contributed to the accident.

Aircraft Materiel Failure

Engine: Includes foreign object damage (FOD).

Instruments, Flight Controls: Self-explanatory.

Navigation, Communication, Radar: Electronic equipment failure.

Landing Gear, Brakes, Tires: Self-explanatory.

Power, Hydraulics: Electric or hydraulic power generation and distribution system failure.

Airframe and Control Surfaces: Includes spoiler, flaps, and cargo door failures.

Other (Self-explanatory)

Phase of Flight (Aircraft status when accident occurred)

Static, Ground Operations: Aircraft was parked or being towed. This includes parked and undergoing maintenance. Engines and/or power systems can be running.

Taxi: This includes taxiing on the ramp, taxiway, and crossing runways. It does not include extension of takeoff or landing roll.

Takeoff, Initial Climb: From start of takeoff roll until departure of airport vicinity with aircraft stabilized on departure heading, speed, and climb rate.

Prolonged Climb: From initial climb until cruise altitude.

In-flight Normal: Cruise flight, including altitude changes not associated with departure or arrival at destination.

Let-Down, Approach: Descent associated with arrival at destination through start of final approach.

Landing: Final approach through turn off of active runway.

Unknown: Damage was detected during postflight inspection, and time of occurrence cannot be determined.

First Type of Accident (If included, this section describes the initial occurrence of the accident.)

TABLE 5. C-141 ACCIDENTS

FIRST TYPE OF ACCIDENT	Engine Failure/ Damage (Other)		196)	Airframe Failure	(Decomp, Ramp, Door)	:	Airframe Failure (Decomp, Ramp, Door)		Landing Gear Failure		Airframe Failure	(original)	Landing Gear Failure	Airframe Failure	(Door)		Landing Gear Failure	Engine Failure/ Dasage (Other)		Landing Gear Failure	Landing Gear Failure
PNASE OF FLIGHT	Takeoff and Initial Climb		jor Aircraft Dam	Prolonged	Q		Prolonged Climb		Takeoff and Initial Climb		Prolonged	C1 1100	Landing	Inflight	Norma 1		Taxi	Takeoff and Initial Climb		Landing	Landing
CAUSES/FACTORS	Maintenance (Procedures/Data),	Aircraft Materiel Failure (Engine)	Additional Accidents (Major Aircraft Damage)	Ma intenance	(Personnel Error, Procedures/Data),	Aircraft Materiel Failure (Cargo Door)	Maintenance (Personnel Error,	Aircraft Materiel Failure (Cargo Door)	Maintenance (Personnel Error).	Aircraft Materiel Failure (Landing Gear/Brakes/Tires)	Aircraft Materiel	Railure (rower/ Hydraulics, Other)	Maintenance (Personnel Error, Procedures Matal	Naintenance	(Personnel Error, Procedures/Data),	Aircraft Materiel Failure (Cargo Door)	Maintenance (Personnel Error)	Maintenance (Personnel Error, Procedures(Data)		Maintenance (Personnel Error, Procedures/Data)	Maintenance (Personnel Error, Procedures/Data)
CLASS	7		Add	2			₹		Ē		3		2	7			2	2		2	2
INJURY DAMAGE CLASS CLASS	×			z			¥		×		×		×	×			z	×		=	₹
ACCIDENT NO.	21			13			Ž		52		91		11	82			19	20		ĸ	23
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FIRST TYPE OF ACCIDENT		Other Aircraft Failure	Collision with	Aircraft (Ground)	Callision with Ground	Callision with Ground		Callision with Ground	Collision with Ground		Flew Into Weather	Front/Storm		Landing Short, Missed Go-Around		royed)	Landing Gear Failure		Destruction)	Other Aircraft Failure	Landing Gear Failure
PHASE OF FLIGHT	Damage Classes)	Static, Ground Ops	Tard		Takeoff and Initial Climb	Letdown, Approach		Letdom, Approach	Letdown, Approach) etdown	Approach		Landing		I, Aircraft Destroyed)	Landing		me Risk of Cargo Destruction)	Static Ground Ops	Static, Ground Ops
CAUSES/FACTORS	Fatal Accidents (All	Maintenance (Procedures/Data,	Equipment/lest beat)	Commication)	Aircrew (Wrong Action)	Aircrew (Wrong Action, Grew Rest).	Airport/Airway/Fac (Comunication)	Aircrew (Communica- tion, Training)	Aircrew (Judgment, Grew Rest), Airport/	Array/Fac (Lon- troller Error, Communication, Radar/	Kadio, tic.)	(Judgment), Acft	(Landing Gear/ Brakes/Tires)	Aircrew (Judgment, Wrong Action, Crew	Rest, Training)	Additional Accidents (Nonfatal,	Maintenance (Procedures/Data).	Aircrait materie: Failure (Landing Gear/Brakes/Tires)	Additional Accidents (May Have Had Some	Aircraft Materiel Failure (Power/ Hydraulics)	Aircraft Materiel Failure (Landing Gear/Brakes/Tires)
DAMAGE		9	_	-	a	0		۵	0		-	-		٥		dition	۵		Accid	2	2
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ACCIDENT INJURY NO. CLASS		ب	,	,	М	•		ď	w		r	•		₩			Φ		Mdd	2	=

TABLE 5 (Continued)

FIRST TYPE OF ACCIDENT	Engine Eailure/ Damage (FOO, Bird Strike), Other Aircraft Failure	:	ingine tallure/ Damage (FOD/Bird Strike)	Engine Failure/ Damage (Other)	Landing Gear Failure		Hard Landing	Hard Landing		Engine Failure Damage (FOO/Bird Strike)	Airframe Failure (Other)	Engine Failure Camage (FOO/Bird Strike)	Engine Failure/ Damage (Other)			Collision with Ground
PHASE OF FLIGHT	Inflight Normal	Static, Ground Ops	lakeoff and Initial Climb	Landing	Text	ı	Landing	Londing		Unknown	Letdown, Approach	Unknown	Takeoff and Initial			Inflight Mormal (Low (Low-Level)
CAUSES/FACTORS	Maintenance (Procedures/Data, Equipment/Test Gear), Aircraft Materiel Sailure (Inst/Fit	Maintenance (Procedures/Data)	Aircrait Materiel Fallure (Engine)	Aircraft Materfel Failure (Engine)	Overweight Taxi Test (Dev Testing, YCI41B,	Edwards AFB), Aircraft Materiel Failure (Land- ing Gear/Brakes/Tires)	Aircraft Materiel Failure (Inst/Fit Controls), Airframe Control Surf (Spoilers/Flaps)	Weather, Aircrew (Wrong Action), Aircraft Materiel Fallure (Landino	Gear/Brakes/Tires]	Aircraft Materiel Failure (Engine)	Maintenance (Personnel Error), Airframe Control Surf (Spoilers, Flaps)	Aircraft Materiel Failure (Engine)	Maintenance (Procedures/Data), Aircraft Materiel	Failure (Engine) Excluded Accidents	Night Low-Level Training, Airdrop	Red Flag (Low-Level)
DAMAGE	£	£	Ĕ	重	듩		£	£		Ē	£	£	£		£	<u>\$</u>
INJURY	=	z :		=	*		*	2		æ	×	=	Z		z	=
ACCIDENT INJURY NO. CLASS	35	% ;	à	8	జ		9	=	;	~	\$	‡	5		9	43
FIRST TYPE OF ACCIDENT	Collision with Ground Collision with Ground	Flew into Weather Front/Storm	Flew into Weather Front/Storm			Airframe Failure (Decomp, Ramp, Door)	Flow into Weather Front/Storm	Landing Short, Missed Go-Around	Collision with		Landing sear Failure	Airframe Fallure (Other)		Collision with Vehicle, Building		Landing Gear Failure
PHASE OF FLIGHT	Taxi Landing	Prolonged Climb	Prolonged Clieb			Inflight Normal	Letdown, Approach	Landing	Text		у. Ж Ф	Unknown		Landing		Static, Ground Ops
CAUSES/FACTORS	Aircrew (Wrong Action) Taxi Aircrew (Wrong Action) Landii Additional Minor Accidents	Weather, Aircrew (Judgment), Aircraft Materiel Failure (May/Com/Radar)	Meather, Aircrew (Sudgment), Airport/	Airway/Fac (Controller Error, Communication, Radar/Radio/etc),	Aircraft Materiel Failure (Mav/Com/Radar)	Airframe/Control Surf (Cargo Door)	Aircrew (Wrong Action), Aircraft Materiel Failure (Airframe/Control Surf)	Weather, Aircrew (Judgment), Airport/ Airway/Fac (Communica- tion)	African (Judgment),	(Committee)	Maintenance (Procedures/Data), Aircraft Materiel Eailure (Landing	Maintenance (Procedures/Data), Airframe Control	Surf (Spoilers/ Flaps)	Airport/Airmay/Fac (Controller Error, Communication	Ground Ops)	Aircraft Materiel Failure (Landing Gear/Brakes/Tires)
DAMAGE	PP	£	¥			£	£	£	Ē		£	를		ž		£
CLASS	* *	=	×			×	×	=	*		=	=		×		×
ACCIDENT INJURY NO. CLASS	23	\$2	32			13	58	\$2	93	;	Ħ	35		33		*

TABLE 6. C-130 ACCIDENTS INVOLVING AIRCRAFT DESTRUCTION

FIRST TYPE OF ACCIDENT	Collision with		Collision with Ground		Engine Failure/ Damon (Other)	,							Hard Landing					landing Short.	Missed Go-Around			•	Engine Failure/ Camage (Other)	Other Aircraft Failure	
PHASE OF FLIGHT	Landing		Le.down, Approach		Takeoff and Initial Climb							;	Landing					tanding					Takeoff and Initial Climb	Taxmoff and Initial Climb) }
CAUSES/FACTORS	Atrones (Wrong	Aircraft Materiel Failure (Landing Gear/Brakes/Tires)	Aircrew (Wrong Action), Aircraft	Materiel Failure (Airframe/Control	Aircrew (Judgment,	Rest), Aircraft	Materiel Failure (Engine)						Weather, Aircrew (Judgment, Wrong Action, Iraining)						(Wrong Action, Communication),	Airport/Airway/rac (Communication)			Aircraft Materiel Failure (Engine)	Maintenance (Procedures/Data). Aircraft Materiel	failure (Landing Gear) Brakes/Tires, Other)
INJURY CLASS	ia.		۱		u.			×	L . 1			ij.	×	u,	æ	¥	æ	 .			u.	la.	L	u.	
CLUBED								×	×	×	×	×		×	×	×	×	×			×	×			
ACCIDENT EXCLUDED INJURY NO. ACCIDENT CLASS	23		22		23			53	8 2	8 1	23	92	ୟ	30	33	32	33	* 1	4		36	37	Я	38	
FIRST TYPE OF ACCIDENT	-	Collision with Ground	Engine Failure/ Damage (Other)	Other Aircraft Failure	Collision with Vehicle, Building		Collision with Aircraft (Ground)		Collision with	Collination with	Ground		Engine Failure/ Damage (Other)		Collision with Ground		Collision with	Ground	Callision with Ground	Collision with		_	Aircraft Failure	(other)	
PHASE OF FLIGHT		Letdown, Approach	Takeoff and Initial Climb	Static. Ground Ops	Taxi		Static. Ground Ops		Landing	t and the	Lending		Takeoff and Initial Climb		Takeoff and Initial Climb		Letdows.	Approach	Letdown, Approach	Inflight			Takeoff and	Initial Climo	
CAUSES/FACTORS		Weather, Aircrew (Judgment, Wrong Action)	Aircraft Materiel Failure (Engine)	Maintenance (Personnel Error)	Aircrew (Judgment)		Haintenance (Personnel Error)		Africes (Wrong Action Training)	Monthly Manney	Weather, Antirem (Judgment, Commu-	nfcation)	Aircrew (Judgment, Wirong Action), Aircraft Materiel	rasture (Engine)	Weather, Aircrew (Wrong Action)	•	Weather, Aircres	(Judgment, Wrong	Weather, Aircrew (Wrong Action)	Aircrew (Wrong	, maria		Ke intenance	(Procedures/Data), Aircraft Materiel Failure (Airframe/ Control Surf)	
INJURY	_	u.	u.	₹	z	×	z	بھا	L	u	-		u ,		<u>.</u>	×			LL,	ų.	L	. 2	. Z		2
KCL UDED C TDENT	×					×		×								×	t				*	٠,	•		×
ACCIDENT EXCLUDED INJURY NO. ACCIDENT CLASS	-	2	m	•	ıc.	9	7	80	•	5	2		Ξ		12	13	1	•	51	16	11	. 2	2 2		20

Table 6 (Continued)

!	FIRST TYPE OF ACCIDENT	Other Aircraft	Failure	Ground		L SEVETE CIASS.															
;	PHASE OF FLIGHT	inflight	Mornal C			ISS A DECOME: BOS															
	ACCIDENT EXCLUDED INJURY NO. ACCIDENT CLASS CAUSES/FACTORS	59 F Weather	(a) and a property of the Market Mark		**************************************	- Accident definitions changed in 1977. Class A decome: Most severe class.															
-	FIRST TYPE OF ACCIDENT		Collision with Ground		Collision with Aircraft (Air)						Collision with Ground	Other Aircraft Failure		Engine Failure/ Damage (Other)	Engine Failure/ Damage (Other)			Callision with Ground	Collision with Ground		Engine Failure/ Damage
	PHASE OF FLIGHT		Inflight Normal		Landing						Takeoff and Initial Climb	Letdown, Approach		Takeoff and Initial Climb	Inflight Normal	8/61 \$ 1/61 -		Landing	Landing		Landing
	CAUSES/FACTORS		Aircrew (Wrong Action, Communica- tion)		Airport/Airway/Fac (Communication)						Aircrew (Wrong Action, Crew Rest, Training)	Aircraft Materiel Failure (Inst/Flt Controls)		Aircrew (Wrong Action), Aircraft Materiel Failure (Engine, Prop)	Maintenance (Procedures/Data), I Aircraft Materiel Failure (Engine, Prop)	Class A* Accidents - 1		Aircrew (Wrong Action)	Aircrew (Wrang Action)		Aircraft Materfel Failure (Engine)
	CLASS	L	L.	u.	<u>.</u>	٠.	u.	L .	۱		L	5	L.	<u>.</u>		5 1	u.	* *	4 4	u.	=
	EXCLUDED ACCIDENT	×		×		×	×	×	٧	×			×				×			×	
	ACCIDENT EXCLUDED INJURY NO. ACCIDENT CLASS	40	=	42	\$	#	45	46	47	4 8	€	S	5	25	53		35	55	95	23	æ

TABLE 7. ACCIDENTS INVOLVING SELECTED AIRCRAFT TYPES, ALL U.S. CARRIERS, ALL OPERATIONS, 1967-1976

PHASE OF FLIGHT	Landing	Inflight	Infilight	Static	Prolonged		Jaxi	Takeotf	Static	Taxi	Letdom	Landing	41-76		nut i saur	Taxí	Landing	Landing	Taxi	Takeoff	Landing	Taxí	Inflight	Landing	Takeoff	Takeoff	Landing	Landing	Takeoff	Landing	Prolonged Climb
FACTORS	Crew Error	Weather	Weather, Crew Error -	Other	Weather, Maintenance/	עשובו ובו	Crew Error	Maintenance/Materiel	Other	Weather, Crew Judgment	Controller Error	Crew Error, Mainte-	וופורב/נתורבו ובו	Weather, Crew Judgment	Mediner, trew Judgment, Maintenance/Materiel	Crew Judgment	Weather, Crew Error	Haintenance/Materiel	Crew Error	Cress Error	Weather, Crew Error	Crex Judgment	Crew Error	Crew Error	Maintenance/Hateriel	Maintenance/Hateriel	Maintenance/Materiel	Crew Error	Crew Error, Mainte- nance/Nateriel	Crew Error	Mea ther
MAKGE	S	S	=	s	0	3	E N	S	S	v	0	۵	,	E :	r	=	S	S	v	S	S	s	vı	×	v	S	0	S	. ,	s	=
INJURY DAMGE	×	v	v	×	L	•	: *	S	×	S	ia.	.	ı	Λ ι	n	æ	×	×	z	z	v	×	N/F	K/S	¥	×	=	×	×	×	и
AIRCRAFT TYPE II	£-3	8-0 0	8-30	£707		727.0	872J	1218	1218	B727	6-2 0	B 707	6	י יי יי	٥	6-30	8-26	9- 20	9C-8	R727	9C-9	9C-8	10/8	8C-9	BC-8	8-30	8-33	DC-9	8707	1018	8747
DATE	4/23/68	8/9/8	6/12/68	5/2/2	1/18/69	6714150	5/14/69	69/6/2	1/14/69	6/52/9	69/6/6	1/26/69	651 66. 8	60/17/	41717	8/18/69	7/20/69	1/31/69	5/8/69	7/29/69	8/12/69	11/20/69	8/3/69	5/6/69	11/28/69	69/11/6	10/16/69	5/3/69	12/1/69	8/1/69	11/4/70
ACCIDENT NO.	1-0064	1-0066	6900-1	1-0003	1-0004	2000	3-0006-2	1-0007	1-0008	1-001	1-0016	1-0017	9600	2100-1	5100-1	1-0051	1-0025	1-0028	1-0035	1-0044	1-0046	1-0050	1-0051	1-0052	1-0054	9500-1	1-0058	1-0060	1-0062	1-0063	1-0001
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PIASE OF FLIGHT	Letdown	Prolonged		Clinb	Landing	Landing	Prolonged	Takeoff	Landing	Inflight	Inflight	Landing	Takeoff	Taxi	Letdown	Letdown	Takeoff	Landing	Landing	Takeoff		Takeoff	Takeoff	Prolonged Climb	Landing	Landing	Static	landing	Landing	Landing	
PNASE OF FLIGHT	Crew Error Letdown	Maintenance/Materiel Prolonged		Controller Error Prolonged	Maintenance/Materiel Landing	Meather Landing	Maintenance/Materiel Prolonged	Controller Com Takeoff	Weather, Crew Judgment Landing	-	Weather Inflight	Maintenance/Materiel Landing	Haintenance/Materiel Takeoff	Weather, Crew Error Taxi	Crew Error Letdown	Crew Error	Crew Error Takeoff	Weather, Crew Error Landing	Weather, Crew Error Landing			Weather, Crew Judgment Takeoff		Maintenance/Materiel Prolonged Climb	Maintenance/Materiel Landing	_		Crass Syrus		Crew Error Landing	
FACTORS	,					_		, ,-	_	-	-	_	_		-		-	_		•						_					
FACTORS	Crew Error					_		, ,-	_	-	-	_	_		-		-	_		•						_					
INJURY DAMAGE FACTORS	F 0 Crew Error			Controller Error		N S Weather		, ,-	_	N S Weather I	-	N S Maintenance/Materiel [_		M S Crew Error	N M Crew Error	-	_		•			F D Crew Error			M S Maintenance/Mater(e)		Annual series	F D Cress Error		
FACTORS	0C-9 F 0 Crew Error	F D Maintenance/Materiel		DAZY E D CONTROLLER EFFOR	8727 N S Maintenance/Materiel	B727 N S Meather	N S Maintenance/Materiel	f G Controller Coun	7 CV850 F D Weather, Crew Judgment 1	DC-8 N S Weather I	DC-8 II S Meather I	7 B707 N S Maintenance/Materiel L	N S Haintenance/Materiel 1	. N S Weather, Crew Error	DC-9 N S Crew Error L	8727 N M Crew Error	: 8727 S D Crew Error 1	8727 N S Weather, Grew Error I	BACI-11 N S Weather, Grew Error 8	8707 N S Weather, Crew Error	B727 N S Weather, Crew Error	DC-9 S D Weather, Crew Judgment	B707 F D Crew Error	M 5 Maintenance/Materiel	Maintenance/Materiel	8207 M S Maintenance/Materiel	27.20	2777 K Craw Error	8707 F D Cres Error	F D Crew Error	

TABLE 7 (Continued)

PHASE OF FLIGHT	Landing	Inflight	Landing	Prolonged Climb	Prolonged Clinb	Takeoff	Takeoff	Prolonged	4	Landing	Landing	Prolonged Climb	Inflight	Takeoff	Taxi		Letdom		Texi	;	Takeoff	Static	Takeoff	Infitght	Inflight	Landing	Landing	Takeoff	Landing	Text	Landing	Inflight
FACTORS	Crew Error	Weather	Maintenance/Materiel	Other	Maintenance/Materiel	Other	Other	Maintenance/Materiel		Weather, Crew Comm	Sther	Maintenance/Materiel. Other	Weather, Crew Error	Maintenance/Materiel	Crew Error, Mainte-	nance/Materiel, Controller Comm	Crew Error, Mainte-	nance/Materiel	Weather, Crew Error, Crew Comm, Controller	Error	Weather, Controller Error	Maintenance/Materiel	Na intenance/Nateriel	Maintenance/Materiel. Other	Weather, Crew Judgment	Crew Judgment	Crew Error	Weather, Maintenance/ Materiel, Other	Haintenance/Materiel	Maintenance/Materiel	Haintenance/Hateriel	Maintenance/Materiel
DAMAGE	0	×	S	v	S	S	v	S		۵	0	S	= :	v	=		6		v		a	s	v	z	E	S	v	S	×	S	S	v
INJURY DAMAGE	la.	s	z	æ	æ	z	=	×		S	u.	æ	S	z	v		L		×		ie.	×	×	S	v	×	×	×	v	¥	¥	×
AIRCRAFT	B707	8747	8727	6-20	830	8747	8-58	B727		6-30	6-5 <u>0</u>	DC-10	8747	6-30	8747		11011		CV880		6-20	6-30 -30	8707	B 707	121	63d	6-30	8747	B707	1218	8727	[101]
DATE	1/25/1	1/1/12	2/26/71	11/81/8	11/22/5	6/20/71	8/14/71	11/11/11		5/18/72	5/30/72	21/21/9	1/4/72	3/19/72	21/1/6		27/29/17	! 	12/20/72		12/20/72	5/10/72	9/13/72	1/18/72	2//00//6	6/14/72	21/82/6	12/15/12	11/1/12	11/8/12	10/1/72	12/28/72
ACCIDENT NO.	1-0025	1-0027	1-0031	1-0036	1-0038	1-0039	1-0043	1-0047		1-0002	1-0003	1-0004	9000-1	1-00-1	1-0013		1-0016	<u>:</u>	1-0017		1-0017A	1-0018	1-0622	1-0027	1-0031	1-0034	1-0035	1-0037	1-0038	0 100- i	1.0041	1-0045
PHASE OF FLIGHT	Landing		Landing	Takeoff	Takeoff	Inflight	Static	Landing	Letdom	Takeoff	;	Landing	Letdown	Inflight	Taxt	Landing	Landing	Takeoff		Prolonged	Inflight		Landing	Landing	Landing	Prolonged Climb	Takeoff	Landing	Letdown		Taxt	Landing
FACTORS	Weather, Crew Error,	Crew Communication	Weather, Crew Judgment	Crew Judgment, Mainte- nance/Materiel	Crew Error, Maintenance/ Takeoff Materiel	Weather	Maintenance/Materiel	Crew Error	Crew Error	Weather, Maintenance/	naterie:	Crew Error Maintenance/Hateriel	Weather	Weather	Maintenance/Materiel	Maintenance/Materiel	Crew Error	Crew Error, Crew Comm.	Controller Error, Controller Comm	Maintenance/Materiel	Crew Error, Controller	Error	Weather, Maintenance/ Materiel	Weather, Crew Error	Weather, Crew Error	Crew Error, Controller Error	Crew Error, Other	Weather, Crew Error, Maintenance/Materiel	Crew Error	Crew Error	Maintenance/Materiel	Controller Error
DAMAGE	s		0	٥	s	=	s	s	0	a	,	_	x	×	S	s	v	-		S	v		8	v	s	0	s	۵	v	s	x	*
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AIRCRAFT	BC-9		چ چ	DC-8F	B 737	8-20	1218	6-30	6-3	8-30		6727 DC-8F	8-56	1028	8727	8727	8720	8707		B7 20	8707		8720	6-30	6-30	6-30	8747	1218	B707	8727	8747	6-3 0
DATE	1/11/70		1/27/10	9/8/10	02/61/2	4/20/70	6/3/70	9/8/70	11/14/70	11/23/70		12/28/70	9/21/10	9/18/70	11/4/70	12/16/70	9/29/70	11/30/70		3/28/70	11/6/1		3/31/71	11/11/2	1/11/1	11/9/9	1/30/11	17/4/6	11/1/8	1/1/1/1	7/23/73	12/4/71
ACCIDENT NO.	1-0002		1-0010	0100-1	1-0012	1-0013	1-0015	9100-1	1-0023	1-0025		1-0026	-0034	1-0037	1-0040	1-0047	1-0053	1-0054		1-0055	1-0001		1-0002	1-0003	1-0004	1-0005	1-0007	1-0008	1-0014	1-0015	1-0017	1-0021

PHASE OF PLIGHT	Prolonged Climb	Taxí	Taxí	Static	Static	Landing	Landing	Static	Landing	Landing	Takeoff	Static	Takeoff	t and inc	The state of the s	Landing	Taxí	Tekeoff	Taxi	Taxí	Takeoff	Landing	Static	Lending	Landing	Landing	Letdom	Taxi	Landing	Tabanéé	Talande	lakeorr	Taxi	Landing
FACTORS	Weather, Cres Error	Crew Judgment	Other	Other	Maintenance/Materiel	Crew Error	Heather, Crew Judgment	Naintenance/Materiel	Na interance/Naterie)	Weather, Crew Judgment, Controller Error	Westher	Kaintenance/Hateriel	Maintenance/Materiel,	Other Hasther from Error	Mediater, tres Error	Maintenance/Materiel	Crew Judgment, Mainte-	nance/materiel Maintenance/Nateriel	Maintenance/Materiel	Weather, Crew Judgment	Heather, Grew Judgment	Crew Error	Other	Meather, Crew Error	Crew Judgment, Crew Error	Crew Error	Maintenance/Materiel	Crew Error	Weather, Controller	Communications (Material	Other	חנותני	Crew Error	Other
AMAGE	۵	×	v	S	×	0	v.	S I	v,	0	v	×	_	v	n .	'n	v	v	=	v	S	N	×	0	-	s	S	v	6	v	, ,	^ (v)	и
INJURY DAMAGE	u.	×	×	×	ls.	L.	()	z	z	u.	v	v	S	v	۰ :	2 2	*	×	S	×	=	S	Ŋ	.44.	u.	×	=	=	v	v	, ,	n :	×	Ŋ
ATRCRAFT	6727	8747	6-30	1218	8707	B707	8737	1219	8707	8727	1218	[101]	DC-10	1273	/7/0	B727	6727	DC-10	DC-10	8-30	8- 3 0	B7 07	1218	8727	8 727	8747	[101]	DC-10	DC-9	B727	1 9		6-J	01-20
DATE	12/1/24	11/21/74	11/21/74	11/25/14	11/25/74	1/22/14	3/31/75	2/4/75	2/18/75	6/24/75	8/1/75	6/14/75	11/12/75	31,51411	C1/31/11	9/0/75 8/23/75	8/16/75	8/25/75	10/16/75	12/22/15	\$1702/8	12/22/75	1/11/16	91/5/16	4/21/16	5/6/76	91/1/9	91/12/5	91/82/9	2/16/76	37/31/11	9//9//11	11/12/16	1/2/16
ACCIDENT NO.	1-0031	1-0037	1-0037A	1-0038	1-0046	1-0047	1-0001	1-0005	1-0003	1-0006	1-0012	1-0019	1-0021		1-0021	1-0027	1-0029	1-0032	1-0037	1-0038	1-0041	1-0044	1-0002	1-0003	1-0005	1-0006	1-0009	0100-1	1.00-1	1-0012	1 (903)	0700-1	1-0022	1-0024
PHASE OF FLIGHT	Taxi	Landing	Static	Taxi	Prolonged	Landing	Lending	Takeoff		ing		Ę	- -	aht	<u>. </u>						· ·			_						-	_			
			ĸ	Ţ	5.5		5	Tak	Taxi	Landing	Takeoff	Letdom	Landing	Inflight	Eurban.	Landing	Taxi	Takeoff		Takeoff	Takeoff	Meconal.	Jufin int	Takenee	Taxi		Landing	Prolonged				Takeoff	Landing	Landing
FACTORS	Naintenance/Nateriel	Crew Error			Maintenance/Materiel Pro	Crew Error Land	rew Error	•	Materie!	_	Maintenance/Materiel Takeo	er Error L	~	s/Materiel		Meather, Crew Error Landing Meather, Crew Fror Landing					mance/Hateriei		Ī	Medines, trew Error Landing	•	Error, Controller Comm	_					•		
	S Maintenance/Materiel	D Crew Error						•		_	•	er Error L	~		Crew Error			S Weather, Crow Judgment Takeoff Crow Error, Maintenance/			mance/Hateriei	-	Mathematics/Pater let		Crew Error, Controller	Error, Controller Comm	O Weather, Crew Error Landing	S Maintenance/Materiel Prolonged		Controller Error,		://kteriel	D Crew Error Landing	M Weather, Crew Judgment Landing
INJURY DANAGE FACTORS	M S Maintenance/Materiel	F D Crew Error	Other	Crew Error				•		_	•	er Error L	~		Crew Error	Meather, Crew Error	Crew Error				mance/Hateriei		Mathematics/Pater let	Mediner, Crew Error	# Crew Error, Controller	Error, Controller Comm	Meather, Crew Error	Maintenance/Materiel	Mather Crass Front	Controller Error,		•		
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INJURY DANAGE	2 B727 N S	0	: 8727 S M Other	B747 K S Crew Error	N S Maintenance/Materiel	N S Crew Error	B727 N S Weather, Crew Error	8707 K S Crew Error	N S Maintenance/Materiel	B DC-9 F D Weather, Crew Error	OC-{ S M Maintenance/Materiel	DC-8 F O Weather, Crew Error L	3 8737 N S Crew Error	8737 N Maintenance/Materiel	8/0/ F 0 Crew Error	S D Meather, Crew Error	8727 K S Crew Error	N S Weather, Crew Judgment Crew Error, Maintenance/	Materiel	8707 F D Other	B727 M S Maintenance/Materiel	SAULT TO COME	DC-10 F S Maintenance/Materies	T D Melicher, Link Error	8707 N M Crew Error, Controller	Error, Controller Comm	S D Weather, Grew Error	N S Maintenance/Wateriel	The state of the s	Controller Error.	Controller Comm	S M Maintenance/Materiel	F D Crew Error	S M Weather, Crew Judgment

ACCIDENT RATES

Total accidents and exposure for C-130, C-141, and commercial aircraft similar to the C-141 are shown in Table 8.

The resulting rates are shown in Table 9 and apply fleet-wide to the aircraft types shown. Exclusions have been made only for accidents occurring during missions completely unlike PNAF missions. No corrections have been made for pilot selection, maintenance controls, or restrictive conditions of flight. The 90% and 98% confidence intervals are taken from Molina's tables 13 by interpolation. The 90% interval is found by taking the interval between the values: "what (high) value of frequency of occurrence would cause the observed number of accidents or fewer to occur in this number of departures only 5% of the time," and "what (low) value of frequency of occurrence would cause the observed number of accidents or more to occur in this number of departures only 5% of the time." The 98% interval is similarly defined, except that 1% is used rather than 5%. The assumption made in determining these intervals is that the Poisson distribution function is applicable—in this case, a very good assumption. No further approximations are made as the intervals come from tables of the actual integral distribution function.

Tables 10 and 11 show accident rates by cause or contributing factor and by phase of flight. They are taken directly from Tables 5, 6, and 7. Table 12 shows causes and factors from the NTSB annual report (Reference 4) and is shown for comparison.

The phase-of-flight tabulations in Table 10 show that negligibly few accidents that destroy aircraft (of the type considered in this study) occur during the "inflight-normal cruise" phase of flight. Virtually all such accidents occur during takeoff or during letdown and landing, with about twice as many occurring in the landing phase as in the takeoff phase.

For this reason, it is inappropriate for this study to give accident rates

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for destroyed aircraft in terms of hours or miles of flight. The preferred method is to use departures.

Table 11 shows which causes and contributing factors are associated with accidents that resulted in destroyed aircraft. Although the meaning of this table is somewhat obscure, it does contain useful information. First of all, note that the table does not apply to normal day-to-day flight conditions. It applies to literally one in a million accidents. Also, it does not indicate how frequently the accidents occur, only what events were associated with the accidents when they did occur. An example may help. It is interesting that in accidents that destroyed commercial aircraft, aircrew errors in judgment or actions were involved in a little over half of the accidents. This is also true for destroyed C-141 aircraft, but the accident rates show that the C-141 accidents occur nearly four times more frequently. Therefore, Table 11 shows that, when an accident situation occurred, the military pilots and the civilian pilots had made the same kind of lapses and errors that led to that accident situation. When we also look at the frequency of accidents (if we simplistically place all accident blame on pilots), we would conclude that the military pilots made these same kind of errors four times more frequently. Therefore, the purpose of Table 11 is to characterize the accident, not to describe accident rates. Differences appearing in this table show differences in the circumstances of the accident.

Table 12 shows the percentage distributions of causes or related factors for commercial aircraft accidents. For the 10-year period (1968 through 1977), weather was the most frequently cited cause/factor in U.S. certificated route air carrier accidents, followed by personnel and the pilot. The pilot, followed by weather and personnel, was the most frequently cited cause/factor in fatal accidents.

TABLE 8. AIRCRAFT DESTROYED (C-130, C-141, COMMERCIAL)

AIRCRAFT	DEPARTURES	AIRCRAFT DESTROYED
C-130	4,833,000	27 (1965-1978)
C-141	2,577,000	9
Commercial	47,590,000	45

Note: The rates and confidence limits are shown in Table 9.

TABLE 9. ACCIDENT RATES FOR ACCIDENTS RESULTING IN DESTRUCTION OF THE AIRCRAFT (PER 1,000,000 DEPARTURES)

AIRCRAFT	98% (LOW)	90% (LOW)	MEAN	90% (HI)	98% (HI)
C-130	4.23	4.65	5.59	8.62	9.62
C-141	1.39	1.82	3.49	6.09	7.30
Commercial	. 67	.74	. 97	1.24	1.35

Note: These rates are "overall rates" not "PNAF rates"—see text for explanation of confidence intervals.

TABLE 10. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS BY PHASE OF FLIGHT

	C- ACFT NO.	141 DEST	C- ACF1 NO.	130 DEST		ERCIAL*		141 ALL %		ERCIAL*
Static	1	11.1	2	6.5	0	0.0	5	10.9	12	6.5
Taxi	1	11.1	1	3.2	0	0.0	6	8.7	24	12.9
Takeoff	1	11.1	9	20.0	11	23.9	6	13.0	36	19.4
Prolonged Climb	0	0.0	0	0.0	5	10.9	5	10.9	15	8.1
Inflight (Cruise)	0	0.0	4	12.9	0	0.0	3	6.5	17	9.1
Let Down	4	44.4	5	16.1	5	10.9	6	13.0	12	6.5
Landing	2	22.2	10	32.3	25	54.3	11	21.7	67	36.0
Unknown	•	_	-	~	_		3	10.9	-	

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^{*} Selected Aircraft Types, All U.S. Air Carriers, All Operations. ** Does not include accidents resulting in passenger injuries without aircraft damage.

TABLE 11. ACCIDENTS BY CAUSE/CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

	CAUSE/	ACFT		ACFT	130 DEST	ACFT	ERCIAL DEST	A	141 LL	A	ERCIAL LL
CONTRIE	BUTING FACTOR	NO.		NO.	%	NO.	*	NO.	%_	<u>NO.</u>	
Weather		1	11.1	8	25.8	19	41.3	5	10.9	56	30.1
Aircrew:	Judgment	4	44.4	7	22.6	7	15.2	8	17.4	21	11.3
	Wrong Action	3	33.3	17	54.8	26	56.5	5	10.9	76	40.9
	Communication	2	22.2	3	9.7	-	-	2	4.3	•	•
	Crew Rest	3	33.3	3	9.7	-	•	3	6.5	•	-
	Training	2	22.2	3	9.7	-	-	3	6.5	٠	•
Maintenar Aircraí	nce or ft Failure	3	33.3	15	48.4	9	19.6	32	69.6	68	36.6
	Maintenance	2	22.2	5	16.1	•	•	18	39.1	•	4
	Acft Failure	2	22.2	12	38.7	-	•	28	60.9		-
	Airways/Ground ions/Other	_3_	33.3	_2	6.5	12	26.1	14	30.4	36_	19.4
(Total No	o. of Accidents) (9)		(31)		(46)		(45)		(186)	

Note: The percentage totals exceed 100% because multiple causes/factors can be cited in any accident.

TABLE 12. CAUSES/FACTORS—CERTIFICATED ROUTE AIR CARRIERS, 1968 THROUGH 1977, FROM NTSB REPORT*

CAUSES/FACTORS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ACCIDENTS	PERCENTAGE OF FATAL ACCIDENTS
Weather	48.3	45.3
Personnel	46.6	42.2
Pilot	39.5	62.5
Airport/Airways/Facilities	9.0	4.7
Landing Gear	8.8	3.1
Power Plant	7.3	4.7
Systems	6.6	9.4
Miscellaneous	6.3	12.5
Instruments/Equipment	2.7	3.1
Airframe	2.4	6.2
Terrain	1.7	0.0
Undetermined	1.2	6.2
Rotorcraft	0.7	3.1

Note: The percentage totals exceed 100% because multiple causes/factors can be cited in any accident.

^{*} Reference 4

CONCLUSIONS

PNAF C-141 Accident Rate

The accident rate for all C-141 accidents is three and one-half per million departures.

The commercial accident rate for aircraft types similar to the C-141 is one per million departures.

PNAF differs from all C-141 aircraft in areas of crew selection and maintenance, but it is not greatly different in conditions of flight. PNAF differs from commercial flights in conditions of flight, but it is assumed to be similar in terms of crew selection and maintenance.

The character of accidents that destroyed C-141 aircraft (non-PNAF) and similar commercial aircraft shows that commercial accidents involved weather about four times more frequently and involved maintenance or material failure about half as frequently.

These differences are interrelated and are not separable because they are not due to independent causes.

If PNAF crew selection and maintenance were equal to the commercial population, the difference in conditions of flight would make the PNAF accident rate lower than one per million departures.

As a conservative high estimate, the PNAF accident rate is judged to be one destroyed aircraft per million departures.

This estimated rate could easily be in error by as much as a factor of two; however, for this type of problem, a factor of two uncertainty is not especially significant.

C-130 Accident Rate

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The C-130 accident rate for the whole fleet, considering all flying and accidents that are not completely unlike PNAF flying, is about five and one-half destroyed aircraft per million departures.

Materiel failure seems to be a more significant factor in C-130 crashes than for the other aircraft considered in this study. Thus, the special maintenance practices for PNAF have a potentially greater effect.

The accident rate for PNAF C-130 missions is estimated to be less than two destroyed aircraft per million departures.

Use of C-130 Aircraft

Whenever short runways and other adverse field conditions exist, it is safer to use C-130 aircraft to carry nuclear weapons to and from such fields than it is to use C-141 aircraft because of the C-130's ability to operate from smaller airfields.

C-130 and C-141 accident rates are not greatly different. In fact, it is not possible to state with high statistical confidence that they are different at all.

PNAF Practices/Important Factors

Crew selection for skill and maturity is important.

Special maintenance practices and controls are probably valuable. They are probably most important as applied to the C-130.

Avoidance of adverse weather is important, especially on landings.

All these practices, taken together, probably cause the PNAF accident rate to be half an order of magnitude lower than the fleet average. They may have as great an effect as a full order of magnitude reduction.

Accident Reporting

The USAF accident reporting system does an excellent job of reporting the circumstances of accidents. The use of this accident data is severely limited by the extremely poor reporting of flying data from which exposure can be determined.

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